Post-Mortem Corporate Payments by Schwartz, Rudolph O.
Volume 68 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 68, 
1963-1964 
3-1-1964 
Post-Mortem Corporate Payments 
Rudolph O. Schwartz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Rudolph O. Schwartz, Post-Mortem Corporate Payments, 68 DICK. L. REV. 257 (1964). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol68/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
POST-MORTEM CORPORATE PAYMENTS
BY RUDOLPH 0. SCHWARTZ*
The taxation of payments by corporations to widows or other bene-
ficiaries of deceased employees is the subject of this Article. In determining
the tax treatment to be given these payments it is necessary to consider
whether they are included in income, estate, and gift taxes, and whether
the corporation may deduct them as business expenses. The treatment de-
pends upon the nature of the post-mortem payment. Payments can be made
either voluntarily or under a contractual obligation. Into the latter classi-
fication fall payments from group life insurance policies, distributions from
qualified pension and profit-sharing plans, and payments made as distribu-
tions from nonqualified plans. In a given fact situation characteristics nor-
mally attributed to one type might be mixed with characteristics normally
associated with one of the other types; but for the purpose of simplicity in
describing the tax consequences of each of these types they will be treated
as though they could be expected to occur as distinct entities. Relevant pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 will, of course, be the nexus
of any tax consequences; also considered are rulings of the Internal Revenue
Service and the case law.
VOLUNTARY POST-MORTEM PAYMENTS
The major tax problem with regard to post-mortem payments which are
made voluntarily is to determine the federal income tax consequences such
payments have on the beneficiaries receiving them. The IRC excludes from
gross income the first 5,000 dollars received by the estate or beneficiaries
of the deceased employee if paid voluntarily or otherwise by or for an em-
ployer on account of the employee's death.' The Code does not provide an
express rule for amounts over the 5,000 dollars.
Income or Gift
If the excess is an amount received "by reason of the death of the
employee," is it necessarily taxable under section 101 (b), or does that section
* A.B., 1935, University of Arizona; LL.B., 1938, University of Wisconsin;
member of the Wisconsin Bar.
This Article was submitted in its original form as a paper to the Section on Taxation
of the American Bar Association. The author wishes to acknowledge assistance in the
preparation of his paper from the following individuals: Harlan F. Harmsen, David L.
Samuels, William A. Wick, and John M. Gradwohl.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (b). Regardless of the number of employers making
such payments, only an aggregate of $5,000 is excludable. Where payments on account
of a deceased employee are divided among several beneficiaries, the exclusion must be
prorated among the several beneficiaries in proportion to their respective percentages of
the total payments. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(a) (3) (1957).
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not apply to payments which are tax-exempt "gifts" within the meaning of
section 102 ?2 For several years after the enactment of the 1954 Code the
IRS insisted that section 101(b) was intended to pre-empt the field of
voluntary payments in respect of deceased employees, precluding treatment
of these payments as gifts. Faced with the persuasive argument that the
legislative history did not support this view, 3 in 1962 the IRS retreated
from this extreme position, stoutly maintaining, nonetheless, that "widow's
payments generally are not gifts."
'4
In 1960 Commissioner v. Duberstein5 and two other cases 6 gave the
Supreme Court an opportunity to attempt the formulation of a principle that
would separate a gift, tax exempt under section 102 of the Code, from a
distribution in the nature of compensation which would be taxable.7 The
Court declined, refusing to "satisfy an academic desire for tidiness, symmetry
and precision in this area," saying that "the governing principles are
necessarily general and have already been spelled out in the opinions of
this Court." Duberstein did decide that "the statute does not use the term
'gift' in the common-law sense,"' 0 and that "the question here remains
basically one of fact, for determination on a case-by-case basis. One con-
sequence of this is that appellate review of determinations in this field must
be quite restricted.""
The Court stated that a payment could not be a gift if it proceeded
from the constraining forces of any moral or legal duty or from the in-
centive of anticipated benefit. "Conversely, where the payment is in return
for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic
benefit from it." "A gift in the statutory sense . . . proceeds from a 'detached
and disinterested generosity' . . . out of affection, respect, admiration,
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a) : "Gross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
3. Crown, Payments to Corporate Executives' Wives, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED.
TAX 815 (1961). See generally Payments to Widows, 49 VA. L. REv. 74, 77-90 (1963).
4. Rev. Rul. 62-102, 1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 28, at 7, modifying Rev. Rul. 60-
326, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 32.
5. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
6. Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278; United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299.
For an excellent discussion of all three cases see Note 49 VA. L. REv. 74 (1963).
7. These cases did not involve employee death benefits; but they did deal with the
tax status of nonobligatory business gratuities. Dubersteip; involved a gift of a Cadillac
to a business acquaintance, Stanton a noncontractual employee separation payment, and
Kaiser a voluntary support payment by a union to a nonmember striker.
8. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 290.
9. Id. at 284.
10. Id. at 285.
11. Id. at 290. This represented a departure from the Court's earlier view in




charity or like impulses."'1 2 The test, concluded the Court, was this: what
was the dominant reason for the transfer ?13 The Commissioner contended
that
payments by an employer to an employee, even though voluntary,
ought, by and large, to be taxable; that the concept of a gift is
inconsistent with a payment's being a deductible business expense;
that a gift involves personal elements; that a business corporation
cannot properly make a gift of its assets.
14
The Court generally agreed with the Commissioner's propositions, but did
not view them as principles of law; rather they were "maxims of experience
that the tribunals which have tried the facts of cases in this area have
enunciated.'
15
The Duberstein case does not specify in what situations a moral duty
to make a payment exists. The question of whethcr there is a moral duty
to provide for the wife and children of a deceased employee so as to dis-
qualify the payment from gift treatment is still unanswered. Although the
Tax Court has suggested that provision for a needy widow may in some
circumstances qualify as a gift, that court has not yet found such circum-
stances present in a case. 16 Whether the "anticipated benefit" to an employer
of good relations with his employees is an economic benefit that would dis-
qualify a payment to an employee's widow from gift treatment is also un-
certain.1 7 A voluntary payment made to the family of a deceased employee
principally in tribute to the deceased for his contribution to the business
and only secondarily as a token of sympathy for the bereaved family would
probably be a "payment in return for services rendered," not qualifying as
a gift. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has affirmed a Tax
Court decision precluding payments from gift classification where the
primary reason for payments to the widow was gratitude for services rendered
by her deceased husband.' 8
12. 363 U.S. at 285.
13. Id. at 286.
14. Id. at 287.
15. Ibid.
16. In Cunning v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. J 9503 (N.D. Tex. 1962)
evidence that a widow was in need influenced the court to find a gift. But in Margaret
H.D. Penick, 37 T.C. 999 (1962) evidence that the widow was an arthritic cripple did
not melt the Tax Court's heart, because she had an income substantially in excess of her
medical expenses, and in Olsen's Estate v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir.
1963) the court flatly stated that there was no "moral obligation" to provide for the
widow of a deceased employee who had already been fully compensated.
17. In Gaugler v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) the court
thought this type of anticipated benefit would disqualify the payment as a gift. There was
testimony to the effect that failure to make the payments would have had an adverse
effect on the reputation of the employer in Wall Street.
18. Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 788 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904
(1962). See in this connection Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert.
1964]
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Some question may exist as to whether a corporate employer can be
motivated by "detached and disinterested generosity." The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Joshel v. Commissioner19 conceded that "these are
personal emotions to which a corporation is not subjected," but held, con-
trary to the Tax Court, that the personal-emotions test of Duberstein did
not apply to a corporation.
20
When the employer deducts his payment to a widow as a business
expense, has he acted inconsistently with a dominant intent to make a gift?
In Duberstein deduction of the payment was thought to be a relevant factor,
but the Court pointed out that the Code did not correlate deductibility by
the corporation with taxability to the beneficiary.2 1 Circuit court decisions
have tended to discount the fact that the payment was deducted as a busi-
ness expense by the employer on the theory that the status of the payment
for the recipient should not depend on how the payor labels it.
22
At least ten factors seem to play a noticeable part in winning gift treat-
ment for voluntary payments made by corporations to beneficiaries of
deceased employees.2 3 Unfortunately, even where all ten of these factors
denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962) ; Gaugler v. United States, supra note 17; Hein v. United
States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9564 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
19. 296 F.2d 645, 647 (1961).
20. But see United States v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1960). Here
the Commissioner's contention that a corporation may not have the "personalized feel-
ings" necessary for a gift under the Commissioner's view of Duberstein was rejected.
21. 363 U.S. at 286.
22. Kuntz Estate v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849, 851 (6th Cir. 1962); Olsen's
Estate v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 1962).
23. The ten factors are as follows:
(1) The absence of any legal or moral obligation to make such payments, the
deceased employee having received all remuneration due him.
(2) The absence of an established policy of making such payments. See Gaugler
v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
(3) The presence of financial need on the part of the widow or other family mem-
bers receiving the death benefits.
(4) The absence of a relationship between the amounts paid and the deceased
employee's salary. Estate of Julius B. Cronheim, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1144 (1961).
(5) The reasonableness of the payments in amount and duration-they should be
proportionate to a widow's need, for example.
(6) The absence of any direct or indirect economic benefit to the corporation
resulting from the payments.
(7) The presence of a corporate resolution and supporting facts which stress the
personal motivations, such as esteem for the deceased employee, sorrow at his passing,
sympathy for his family and intent to provide for their needs as the deceased would have
provided for them, had he lived, and which omit any suggestion that the payments are
in return for, or even in recognition of, valuable services rendered by the deceased.
(8) The absence of any stockholder, director, or employee relationship between
the individuals receiving such payments and the payor corporation.
(9) The absence of any attempt by the corporate employer to withhold taxes
upon the payments, as was the case in Roy I. Martin, 36 T.C. 556 (1961), or to deduct
them from corporate income under headings so out of harmony with donative intent as
"compensation to officers," as in Frankel v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn.
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combine, it cannot be predicted with confidence that the bereaved widow
will reach her tax-exempt gift sanctuary without litigation.
Considerable confusion has developed in this area between the IRS,
the Tax Court, and the federal circuit and district courts..2 4 Since Duberstein
there have been no Tax Court cases decided in favor of the taxpayer which
involved employee death benefits.2 5 Prior to the Supreme Court decision,
an almost unbroken line of Tax Court cases held for the taxpayer.2 6 The
turnabout is a remarkable one, particularly when viewed in light of the
pronouncement in Duberstein that "the governing principles . . . have already
been spelled out in the opinions of this Court. '27 Other than the Tax Court,
1961) or "administration expenses," as in Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) or "business expenses," as in Estate of Louis Rosen, 21 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 316 (1962).
(10) The payment of the benefits to the widow or family of the deceased rather
than to his estate. Brayton v. Welch, 39 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1941); Estate of
Edward Bausch, 14 T.C. 1433 (1950). Contra, Estate of Frank v. Foote, 28 T.C. 547
(1957).
24. See, e.g., Cowan v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ga. 1960). The
court, swayed by the sympathetic tenor of the corporate resolution, found the payments
to be a gift to the widow, even though made "in recognition of Mr. Cowan's invaluable
services to the company." Recently the federal circuit court of appeals in Philadelphia
and the federal district courts in Wisconsin, New York, Maryland, and Massachusetts
have found similar payments to be taxable income and not tax free gifts. Martin v. Com-
missioner, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9575 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Smith v. Commissioner, 62-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9574 (3d Cir. 1962); Brown v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
f 9696 (D. Mass. 1963); Froehlinger v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9492
(D. Md. 1963); Hein v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9564 (E.D. Wis. 1962);
Gaugler v. United States, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9439 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
25. See Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Waters v. Com-
missioner, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 252 (1963) ; Doumahes v. Commissioner, 36 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 249 (1963); Oppenheimer Casing Co. v. Commissioner, 22 CCH Ct. Mem.
1082 (1963) ; Margaret H.D. Penick, 37 T.C. 999 (1962) ; Estate of Louis Rosen, 21
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 316 (1962); Mary C. Westphal, 37 T.C. 340 (1961); Roy I.
Martin, 36 T.C. 556 (1961); Estate of Julius B. Cronheim, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1144 (1961); Estate of W.R. Olsen, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1961) ; Estate of
Irving B. Cooper, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 774 (1961); Mary T. Fischer, 20 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 318 (1961); Estate of Rose A. Russek, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 123 (1961) ;
Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65 (1960), rev'd sub noma. Poyner v. Commis-
sioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Ivan Y. Nickerson, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1508
(1960); Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1379 (1960), rev'd sub
nor. Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962); Abe A. Danish,
19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1349 (1960).
In Oppenheimer, supra, it was the Commissioner who contended that the benefits
paid constituted a gift-the Tax Court still held that the payments were compensation.
26. Florence S. Luntz, 29 T.C. 647 (1958). Estate of Albert W. Morse, 17 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 261 (1958); Standard Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co., 17 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 207 (1958) ; Estate of John A. Mayconn, Sr., 29 T.C. 81 (1957) ; Louis K. Aprill,
13 T.C. 707 (1949). The sole case in which a taxpayer was defeated was Estate of
Charles J. Ginsberg, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 472 (1951).
27. 363 U.S. at 284. Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented about this in his con-
curring opinion:
What the Court now does sets factfinding bodies to sail on an illimitable ocean
of individual beliefs and experiences .... I am afraid that by these new phras-
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however, the federal courts have concluded that what was considered to be a
gift before Duberstein should continue to be so regarded thereafter.2 8 In the
face of this conflict in the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court recently
denied certiorari to four key cases.2 9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's warning of
cases decided in "an illimitable ocean of individual beliefs and experiences"
3 0
comes to mind.
The Employer's Business Expense Deduction
The Treasury Regulations under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
provided that amounts paid for a limited period as pensions or continuations
of salary in recognition of past services to families or dependents of deceased
employees were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
31
The rule applied though the payments were purely voluntary.3 2 No com-
parable provision appears in the Regulations for the 1954 Code, but the
omission was not thought to represent a change in the attitude of the IRS.
33
In fact a 1939 Revenue Ruling34 to the effect that a gift may be deductible
under proper circumstances was relied upon in some private rulings issued
in 1959. 35 The new IRS tactic of disallowing both the business expense
ings the practicalities of tax administration which should be as uniform as is
possible in so vast a country as ours, will be embarrassed. Id. at 296-97.
28. See Estate of Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962). In
United States v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960) the widow's previous salary
as a secretary was discontinued pending payment to her of a monthly stipend "in
recognition of her husband's services." Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.
Wis. 1961) held that voluntary payments to a widow-director in excess of $30,000 were
gifts, although they were deducted as salary allowances. It was held in Frankel v. United
States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd, United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) that payments to a widow consisting of
the bonus and salary her husband would have received if he had lived, and a company
car, were gifts although they were deducted as compensation. And see Cowan v. United
States, 191 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ga. 1960) ; Paxton v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
1 9686 (S.D. Ala. 1962) (payments held gift although corporation later disclaimed
donative intent); Schwartz v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9661 (N.D. Tex.
1962) ; Palmer v. Mathis, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9636 (E.D. Ark. 1962) ; Cunning v.
United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9593 (N.D. Tex. 1962).
29. Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904
(1962) ; Estate of Olsen v. Commissioner, supra note 28; Frankel v. United States,
supra note 28; Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962).
30. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 284 (concurring opinion).
31. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(b)-9 (1953).
32. Rev. Rul. 54-625, 1954-2 CuM. BULL.
33. It has been suggested that the omission merely reflects a belief on the
Treasury's part that the deduction should be taken as deferred compensation under
§ 404. Diehl, Payment to Widows of Corporate Employees, U. So. CAL. 1960 TAX INST.
491. This view, however, was rejected in Champion Spark Plug Co., 30 T.C. 295 (1958).
Although the Treasury refused to acquiesce in this decision, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 9, it
was affirmed. Commissioner v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 266 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1959).
34. I.T. 3329, 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 153.
35. 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.67, at 218 (1960).
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deduction and the section 102 gift exclusion, creating a conflict between the
payor and the payee may signal a change of position on the entire question
of deductibility.36 1 The Commissioner has long argued that the taking of a
business-expense deduction is irreconcilable with a donative intent. That
the Supreme Court in Duberstein accepted this proposition as one of the
"maxims of experience"3 7 may play a role in determining its treatment in
the future.
A few recent Tax Court cases involved a determination of whether post-
mortem corporate payments were deductible as business expenses. The deduc-
tion was denied for a payment made in gratitude for a president's outstand-
ing services, because no business purpose was found to exist. 38 In two cases
widows were held to have received dividends rather than death benefits. "' 9
Two other Tax Court cases allowed the deduction ;40 in one of them the
court said the payments were neither gifts nor dividends.
41
Gift Tax Consequences to the Employer
Should the death-benefit payment constitute a gift, gift tax liability
would seem to follow inevitably, assuming payments in excess of available
exclusions and exemptions; however, the federal gift tax is a levy upon
individuals only, 42 and not upon corporations. 43 The Regulations cope with
this problem by treating a gift by a corporation as a gift by its stock-
holders.44 Presumably, the gift of each stockholder would be proportionate
to his percentage interest in the stock of the company.
Liability of Decedent's Estate
If the death benefit qualifies as a gift under section 102, it is not in-
cludable in the deceased employee's gross estate for federal estate tax pur-
poses. The gift never vested as a property right in the decedent or came
into existence as a property right in anyone until after his death. The pay-
ment must be purely discretionary on the part of the employer. A payment
enforceable by the decedent as a customary bonus is included in his gross
36. See Estate of Louis Rosen, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 316 (1962) ; Pelisek, Tax
Treatment of Widows, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 366, 374 (1961).
37. 363 U.S. at 287.
38. Interstate Drop Forge Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mee. 701 (1963).
39. Schner-Block Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 796 (1963) ; Rubber Associates, Inc.,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 576 (1963).
40. Oppenheimer Casting Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1082 (1963) ; J. Aron & Co.,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1963).
41. Oppenheimer Casting Co., supra note 40.
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2501.
43. Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1(b) (1958).
44. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(b)(1) (1958).
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estate.45 The same principle obtained in the case of an established policy
in favor of paying stated death benefits.
46
GROUP LIFE INSURANCE
The preceding portion of this Article discussed the tax consequences
of payments made voluntarily by corporations; attention will now be directed
to post-mortem payments which are not voluntary in nature. The proceeds
of group life insurance policies will be the first type of payments considered.
Group insurance can be divided into three categories, group term, group
permanent, and a mixture of term and permanent. The tax consequences
of each may differ somewhat.
Inclusion in Decedent's Estate
All insurance proceeds payable to the decedent's estate, whether from
group plans or otherwise, are part of his gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes.47 This is true even though the decedent was not the policy owner,
could not designate his estate the insurance beneficiary, and possessed no
incidents of ownership in the insurance at the time of his death. Even if
the estate is not named beneficiary, insurance proceeds will be considered
payable to the estate if they are legally bound for the payment of charges
which would otherwise be enforceable against the executor, as when the
insurance has been pledged as collateral for a loan to the decedent.
48
Insurance payable to a beneficiary other than the insured's estate is
included in his estate for estate tax purposes if the insured possessed an
incident of ownership in the insurance policy at the time of his death.
49
"Incident of ownership" is a comprehensive term denoting any economic
benefit under the policy.50 Rights to cancel, surrender, assign, or pledge the
policy, or change beneficiaries under the policy, are incidents of ownership.
Under the normal group life insurance policy, the insured has the right to
designate and change beneficiaries.
45. Estate of A.B. King, 20 T.C. 930 (1954); Estate of P.G. Leoni, P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 678 (1948); Estate of L.B. McKitterick, 42 B.T.A. 130 (2d Cir. 1942).
46. G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 160.
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(1). The exemption of payments from a qualified
pension or profit-sharing plan does not apply to amounts receivable by executors. INT.
REV. Coo OF 1954, § 2039(c).
48. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (1) (1958). Insurance may not be considered payable
to an estate although paid to an executor if under state law the proceeds are not ad-
ministered and distributed as a part of the decedent's estate subject to creditor's claims,
but pass to the exclusive benefit of the widow and children. LOWENDES & KRAMER,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 278-79 (2d ed. 1962).
49. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2). An exemption has been provided, however,
for proceeds of policies purchased by the trustee of a noncontributory pension or profit-
sharing plan payable to beneficiaries other than the insured's estate.
50. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1958).
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The mere fact that the beneficiary was selected by the deceased em-
ployee would not automatically render the insurance proceeds includable in
the employee's gross estate if he did not continue to possess incidents of
ownership up to the time of his death. It would be difficult, however, for
an employee to assign a group term life insurance policy so as to divest him-
self of all incidents of ownership therein. The master group contract ordi-
narily prohibits assignment of the policy. Furthermore, most states have laws
requiring that the employee be given a conversion privilege to exercise on
termination of his employment. Thus, the employee would probably continue
to possess an incident of ownership, because upon quitting his job he could
effect a conversion of the policy by acting in conjunction with the assignee.
Any irrevocable designation of beneficiary by an insured, especially
under a group term policy which is normally renewable annually, is likely
to constitute a transfer in contemplation of death.51 Even if the designation
is made more than three years prior to the employee's death, the continued
payment of premiums could be treated by the Commissioner as though made
by the employee, "as a matter of tax substance.
'52
Although an insured employee is entitled to designate the beneficiary
under his group insurance, the proceeds are not included in his gross estate
if their payment or continuation of the insurance was dependent upon the
discretion of the employer. Unless the employee has an unqualified right
in the insurance, either alone or in conjunction with another person, he
would not possess an incident of ownership53 or own an interest in property
passing at death. 54 In Dimock v. Corwin55 an employee was considered not
to have a taxable interest in death benefits payable to his widow, because
the employer reserved the right to cancel payment at any time prior to the
employee's death. The Commissioner had ruled in 1937 that forfeitable
benefits were not taxable. 6 In 1952 this ruling was revoked, and the posi-
tion taken that where an employee has the power to designate a beneficiary,
he is in possession of rights under a plan which constitute property passing
at his death.57 While the Dimock case has been followed in the majority of
decisions in this area,58 occasional decisions have held that under the par-
51. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1 (1958).
52. With respect to group-term life insurance, as distinguished from group-
permanent life insurance, the Commissioner is also likely to take the position that the
entire proceeds of the policy are includable and not merely the proportionate amount
attributable to payment of the last three years' premiums. Cf. Commercial Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Johnson, 123 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
53. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2).
54. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
55. 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd on other grounds, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir.
1938), 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
56. G.C.M. 17817, 1937-1 CuM. BULL. 281.
57. G.C.B. 27242, 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 160.
58. E.g., Estate of William E. Barr, 40 T.C. No. 27 (May 3, 1963).
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ticular plans involved the employees' rights became sufficiently fixed to
constitute enforceable obligations though subject to forfeiture if the em-
ployees terminated their employment or were discharged for cause.59
Income Tm Consequences of Group Insurance
The employee's income tax consequences with respect to the premiums
paid for group insurance are to a great extent dependent upon the type of
insurance at hand. Premiums paid by an employer for group-term life insur-
ance and split-dollar plan insurance are not taxable to the employee even
if he has a right to designate the beneficiary. ° The proposed Revenue Bill
of 1963 would limit this rule to the cost of 30,000 dollars protection for any
one individual.61 Premiums paid by an employer on group permanent life
insurance are taxable income to the employee if his rights in the insurance
are nonforfeitable. If permanent and term are mixed the premiums are taxable
to the employee proportionately to the extent of his permanent coverage.
62
If group-permanent life insurance is forfeitable, for example when the cor-
poration retains the right to designate the beneficiary, the insurance pre-
miums do not constitute taxable income to the beneficiary;63 the employee
would be taxed only on the value of any nonforfeitable rights he might have
received under the contract.
If group-permanent life insurance is part of a qualified plan and pro-
ceeds of the policy are payable to a beneficiary named by the employee, then
the proceeds are taxable to the beneficiary as income, because they are not
includable in the decedent's gross estate. If the premiums on this insurance
were partly paid by the employee, or if he was taxable on a portion of
them, proper adjustments would be required to reflect that amount which
would not be taxable. 64 Capital gains treatment for lump-sum payments,6 5
the 1,000 dollar surviving spouse exclusion, 6  and the 5,000 dollar death-
benefit exclusion6 7 are also available for adjustment purposes.
59. Rosenberg v. United States, 309 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Charleston Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12, 161 (S.D.W. Va. 1963) ; see cases
collected in LOWENDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 48, at 26-7 n.1l.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6416, 1959-2 CuM. BULL.
126; Rev. Rul. 56-400, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 116. But premiums paid by a trustee on group-
term life insurance are currently taxable to the employees. Rev. Rul. 54-52, 1954-1 CuM.
BULL. 150.
61. H.R. 8363, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
62. Mim. 6477, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 16. Under a contributory plan the employees'
income taxes on the funds can be reduced by a stipulation that the employees' con-
tributions are to be applied first against the cost of the permanent life insurance.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2); Mim. 6477, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 16.
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-8 (1956).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.403(a) (1956).
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(d) (1) (B).
67. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b)(2).
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The Employer's Deduction for Premiums
An employer is entitled to deduct as an ordinary and necessary business
expense the cost of group-term life insurance on employees and salesmen.
68
The deduction is not allowed if the employer is directly or indirectly a
beneficiary under the policies.69 Thus, where group-term life insurance is
used to fund a shareholder's buy-sell agreement, a private-letter ruling
states that the premium is not deductible. 70 If insurance coverage for share-
holder employees is disproportionately large, payment of the premiums might
be treated as a nondeductible dividend from the corporation.
Premiums paid on group-permanent life insurance payable to employees'
personal beneficiaries are deductible only if the right to the insurance is non-
forfeitable when the premiums are paid. 71 If the employee's rights in the
insurance are then forfeitable, the employer is not allowed a deduction at
any time.
Normally, it can be seen, the corporation has the right to deduct pre-
miums on group life insurance as a business expense when the employee
has the right to name the beneficiary. 72 If the corporation retains the right
to designate the beneficiary, the payments are not deductible by the cor-
poration, which can be considered a beneficiary under the policies.
73
Gift Tax Consequences
Unless the insured employee makes an irrevocable beneficiary desig-
nation and divests himself of all reversionary interests and power to control
the economic benefits of his policy 7 4 (extremely unlikely under a group life
insurance contract), the federal gift tax is not applicable to him. The cor-
poration's gift tax liability, however, is not entirely free from doubt.
7 5
QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
For tax purposes there are two classifications of pension and profit-
sharing plans, qualified 76 and nonqualified. Tax consequences of payments
under the plans differ according to the type of plan under which payments
68. Rev. Rul. 56-400, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 116; Rev. Rul. 54-165, 1954-1 CuM. BULL.
17.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.264-1 (1957).
70. 7 CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 6496.
71. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (5).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-8 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6665, 1963-32 INT. REV. BULL. 7.
73. See Treas. Reg. § 1.264-1 (1957) ; Private Letter Ruling, 7 CCH 1962 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. 6496.
74. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h), Example (8) (1958).
75. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2501(a). But see Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)1
(1958).
76. § 401 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 states which plans are qualified.
1964]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
are made. The consequences with respect to qualified plans will be con-
sidered first.
Decedent's Gross Estate
The estate tax was often imposed on distributions from qualified plans
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 7 7 The 1954 Code provides, how-
ever, that a deceased employee's gross estate does not include the value
of annuities or other benefits payable to a beneficiary, other than the
decedent's executor, under qualified pension and profit-sharing plans.78 In
the event payment is made to the executor, the entire amount is included in
the decedent's gross estate. A payment of the joint-and-survivor variety made
upon the death of the employee is excluded from his gross estate by the
Regulations.79 The Treasury has adopted a similar rule for the case of a
lump-sum distribution to a designated beneficiary upon the employee's death
prior to his retirement.80
An employee might make an election under a qualified plan to have
the benefits credited to him, with interest payable to him for life, and the
principal payable to a named beneficiary or to himself if the employee later
desires to take it. Here the doctrine of constructive receipt applies; the pay-
ment would not be considered payable under the plan, and the section 2039
exclusion would not be applicable.8 1
Nor does the exclusion apply to any portion of the benefits which are
attributable to contributions made by the employee under a contributory or
thrift plan. In this situation the amount excluded is that amount which bears
the same ratio to the value of the payment to the beneficiary as the em-
ployer's contribution to the coverage bears to the total cost of the employee's
protection.8 2 When the employer's contribution cannot be readily ascer-
tained, the Regulations provide that the total contributions shall be the value
of the annuity or other amount payable, as of the time the decedent's rights
first mature; from this amount is subtracted the amount of the employee's
contribution, and the balance represents the employer's contribution.
8 3
77. Pierce Rosenberg v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 12,119 (7th Cir.
1962) ; Estate of Garber v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1959) ; Sample v. United
States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12004 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
78. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c).
79. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b) (3), Example (1) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666,
1963-32 INT. REV. BULL. 22.
80. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b) (3), Example (2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666,
1963-32 INT. REV. BULL. 22.
81. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b) (3), Example (4) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666,
1963-32 INT. REV. BULL. 22.
82. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(c) (1) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666, 1963-32 INT. REV.
BULL. 22.




In 1962 section 2039 of the Code was amended to deny the exclusion
to self-employed individuals. Contributions made on behalf of a person with
net earnings from self-employment are considered contributions made by
him as an employee, and the entire amount payable under the plan is in-
cludable in his gross estate.
8 4
Income Tax Liability of Recipients
Distributions from qualified pension and profit-sharing plans are con-
sidered taxable income, and are taxed to the recipients in accordance with
sections 402 and 403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The effect of
these sections is that such distributions are taxed as annuities under sec-
tion 7285 unless the total distribution is paid within one taxable year of
the distributee in which case a special rule is provided.
8 6
An exclusion ratio is provided to prevent the taxation of that portion
of payments which represents the return of amounts contributed to the plan
by the employee.8 7 If the amount receivable within the first three years is as
great as the amount contributed by the employee, all payments received are
excluded from gross income until the amount so excluded equals the amount
contributed by the employee.88 Thereafter all payments received are fully
taxable. If the employee's contributions are not recoverable in three years,
then their total is prorated over the payments, the proration scheme depend-
ing on the type of payment involved.8 9
Distributions payable within one taxable year of the distributee on
account of an employee's death or other separation from service, or on
account of his death after separation from service, are given capital
gains treatment.9 0 If the entire amount of the employee's account at
the time of his death is paid out within the one taxable year and a later
payment is made in the succeeding year as the result of a year-end contri-
bution of the employer, the first distribution is entitled to capital gains treat-
ment, and the subsequent payment is treated as ordinary income.9 ' The
survivor of an employee is entitled to the capital gains treatment even though
the employee received payments prior to his death.
92
84. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c).
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a) (1).
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a) (2).
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(b).
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(d).
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-5 (1956) sets forth the methods of prorating to be applied
to various kinds of payments, single life, joint-and-survivor annuity, and so forth.
90. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a) (2).
91. Treas. Reg. 1.402(a)-1 (a) (6) (ii) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6499 1960-2 CuM.
BULL. 19; Rev. Rul. 56-558, 1956-2 CuM BULL. 290.
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.403(a)-2(b) (1) (1956).
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The 5,000 dollar death-benefits exclusion93 is available to recipients.
The exclusion does not apply to amounts which the employee had imme-
diately before his death a nonforfeitable right to receive while living.
94
Obviously, from the recipient's standpoint it is desirable to show that the
employee had only a forfeitable right to receive benefits before his death in
order to obtain the exclusion.9" In 1959 the IRS ruled that if an employee
can withdraw his own contribution upon leaving the service of the employer,
forfeiting the corporation's contributions and his right to death benefits, the
exclusion is applicable. 6 A recent Tax Court case held the exclusion available
because of a clause in the plan which provided that the employee's benefits
would be forfeited if he were discharged for dishonesty.
97
In the case of a total distribution within one taxable year of the dis-
tributee, to which the capital-gains provision is applicable,9" the exclusion
is available even though the employee had a nonforfeitable right to receive
the benefits while living.99 In the event the payments are made over a period
of years, the 5,000 dollar exclusion is treated as a contribution of the em-
ployee, and as such excluded from the income of the beneficiary.100
Sections 402 and 403 of the Code were amended in 1962 to eliminate
the capital-gains provision with respect to self-employed individuals ;101 how-
ever, the amount of tax payable by them on a total distribution was limited.
102
Also aimed at self-employed individuals was an amendment of the annuity
provisions of section 72 to provide that the portion of contributions not
deductible is to be considered as representing contributions by the employee'1 3
and the portion deductible, contributions by the employer.10 4 Section 101 was
amended too, and provides now that the 5,000 dollar exclusion for death
benefits is not applicable to self-employed individuals. 0 5
Gift Tax Liability of Employee
The Federal Gift Tax contains an exemption for the designation of a
beneficiary under a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan: "The exercise
or nonexercise by an employee of an election or option whereby an annuity
93. INT. RE'v. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b).
94. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b) (2) (B).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(d) (1957).
96. Rev. Rul. 59-225, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 36.
97. Hazel W. Pollnow, 35 T.C. 715 (1961).
98. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 403(a) (2).
99. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b) (2) (B).
100. Rev. Rul. 58-153, 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 43.
101. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402-03.
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(m).
103. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(d)(2).
104. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(m) (2).
105. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b) (3).
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or other payment will become payable to any beneficiary at or after the
employee's death shall not be considered a transfer" for gift-tax purposes.'
0 6
Thus, if an employee makes an irrevocable election under which he would
receive a lesser annuity and his wife continue to receive payments after his
death, no portion of the value of the annuity is subject to the gift tax.
I0 7
The exclusion applies only to payments attributable to contributions made
by an employer: a proportionate amount of the payments is taxable for con-
tributions made by the employee under a contributory or thrift plan.1
0 8
Nor is the gift tax exclusion applicable to payments attributable to contribu-
tions made by a self-employed individual. 0 9
The Employer's Deduction
Corporations may deduct from adjusted gross income contributions
to a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan under section 404 of the Code
if the payments satisfy the requirements of section 162 or 212.110 There are
certain limitations as to the amounts that may be deducted."1 ' One of them
is that contributions for self-employed individuals will not be recognized if
in excess of 2,500 dollars or ten per cent of earned income, whichever is
less," 2 and only one-half of the allowable contribution may be deducted." 3
NONQUALIFIED PLANS-GENERALLY
In determining the tax consequences of post-mortem payments from
nonqualified plans, the inter vivos effects of transactions between the em-
ployer and employee during the employee's lifetime must be considered. To
give the earlier transactions their proper consequences, one must keep in
mind that double deductions are not intended.
The Employer's Deduction
The employer is entitled to a deduction for contributions to, or amounts
paid under, any form of employee benefit plan if the employee's rights in
the benefits are nonforfeitable at the time of the employer's contribution." 4
The practitioner working with post-mortem payments must examine the
terms of the plan, and if the employee had nonforfeitable rights when the
106. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2517(a).
107. Treas. Reg. § 25.2517-1(b)(2) (1958).
108. Treas. Reg. § 25.2517-1(c) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666, 1963-32 INT. REV.
BULL. 22.
109. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2517(b).
110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a).
111. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a).
112. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(e)(1).
113. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a)(10).
114. 1NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (5).
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employer contributed to the plan, the employer should have taken at that
time the only deduction to which he is entitled. If the amount of the pay-
ments exceeds the amount of total employer-employee contributions, the
excess would represent the earnings of the fund, and the employer is not
entitled to a deduction for earnings.
An employee has nonforfeitable rights in a fund if there is no con-
tingency under the plan which may cause the employee to lose his rights in
the contribution. 1 , According to the Treasury Regulation which provides
that definition, if an employee loses the right to his annuity should his
services be terminated before retirement, then his interest is forfeitable. The
mere fact that an employee may not live to his retirement date, or may live
for only a short period of time thereafter, and may not be able to enjoy the
receipt of benefits under his plan, does not make his interest forfeitable.
Thus, if the trustee of a funded trust is obligated to use the employer's
contribution to provide an annuity for the employee, provided only that the
employee be alive when the payments become due, the employee's rights in
the contributions are nonforfeitable.
An employee may have forfeitable rights in the employer's contributions
but nonforfeitable rights in his own. For example, under the terms of a
contributory plan the employee might be permitted to withdraw his own
contributions at any time. If an employee's interest in a plan is contingent
upon his not withdrawing his own contributions, his beneficial interest in
the contributions made by his employer is forfeitable."' 6
When no actual fund is set aside, the beneficiaries' rights resting upon
an unsecured promise to pay, the employer will be entitled to a deduction
at the time of the post-mortem payment. Previously, no payment was made
for which a deduction was allowable, because only when the amounts are
actually paid over to the beneficiary do the employee's rights become non-
forfeitable.
17
Conversely, if the employee's rights in a funded plan were forfeitable,
the Regulations make it clear that the employer is never allowed a deduc-
tion-in the year in which the amounts are actually paid to the beneficiary
or any other.' 18 Russel Mfg. Co. v. United States"1 9 represents a contrary
result, but the Commissioner refuses to acquiesce in that decision.' 20
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l(a) (1956).
116. Rev. Rut. 59-255, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 36.
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a) (12) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6534, 1961-1 INT. REV.
BULL. 145.
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a) (12) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6534, 1961-1 INT. REV.
BULL. 145.
119. 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct. C1. 1959).
120. Rev. Rul. 59-383, 1952-2 CUM. BULL. 456.
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Income Tax Liability of the Beneficiary
Any portion of post-mortem payments to beneficiaries on which the
employee paid income tax during his lifetime will not be taxed to the bene-
ficiary. Thus, employer contributions in which the employee had non-
forfeitable rights and which were required by sections 402(b) and 403(c)
to be included in the employee's gross income are not taxable. Nor are any
contributions of after-tax capital made by the employee taxable to the bene-
ficiary. Payments under the plan are treated as annuities, and the tax-free
amounts are considered "investments in the contract.' 21 Except for those
portions of the payments on which the employee has already paid income
tax, post-mortem payments from nonqualified employee-benefit plans are
clearly ordinary income to the beneficiary.
22
The beneficiary is entitled to the 5,000 dollar death-benefits exclusion
only if the employee did not possess, immediately before his death, a non-
forfeitable right to receive the payments, or some part of them, while
living.' 23 It should be pointed out that the employee's right to receive pay-
ments while living can be made forfeitable or nonforfeitable with compara-
tive ease. The Tax Court held that an employee's rights were forfeitable
under a plan which provided that he could be fired and would lose his
rights under the plan for conduct constituting a felony or misdemeanor in-
volving moral turpitude, or for willful disloyalty to his employer.
124
The question of whether the employee had "nonforfeitable rights to
receive the amounts while living" is closely associated with a determination
of whether or not post-mortem payments from employee-benefit plans are
income in respect of a decedent, falling under section 691. If the payments
are of that character the 5,000 dollar death-benefits exclusion does not apply,
because the Code provides that income in respect of a decedent maintains the
same character in the hands of the recipient as it had in the hands of the
decedent, who was, of course, not entitled to the 5,000 dollar exclusion. 25
Instead, the recipient is entitled to a deduction for the amount of his tax
attributable 'to that income, or the amount by which the decedent's estate
tax was increased by reason of the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate
of the benefits as income in respect of a decedent. 26 While Congress has
not defined "income in respect of a decedent," the Treasury Regulations
state that the term encompasses income to which a decedent was entitled
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-8(a) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6665, 1962-32 INT. REV.
BULL. 7.
122. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 61, 101(b), 402, 403.
123. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b) (2) (B).
124. Hazel C. Pollnow, 35 T.C. 715 (1961).
125. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 691; Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-3 (1957).
126. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 609(c).
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and which would have been included in his gross income, but which was not
properly includable in his last taxable year.127 Some authorities are of the opin-
ion that payments from employee benefit plans are income in respect of a dece-
dent to the extent of the employee's nonforfeitable rights in the plan.""8
Only two cases have considered the question; they are in direct conflict.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Hess v. Commissioner
1" 9
held that such payments were income in respect of a decedent while a Cali-
fornia district court in Lacomble v. United States'3 ° held that they were not.
Another issue related to the forfeitability of the decedent's rights was
the question of whether the doctrine of constructive receipt applied to pay-
ments under unfunded plans. In the past, tax practitioners were hesitant to
allow an employee to have nonforfeitable rights in an unfunded plan, so that
the employee would not be held to have constructively received the sums
promised as death benefits. Constructive receipt would have meant their in-
clusion in the employee's gross income;131 and "return of capital," or the
"investment in the contract concept," would then require the tax-free receipt
by the beneficiary of any amounts which had already been taxed.
In 1960 a Revenue Ruling eliminated this issue by making it clear that
the doctrine of constructive receipt does not apply to the unfunded-plan situ-
ation.13 2 A mere promise to pay, which is not secured in any way, will not
be regarded as a receipt of income for one employing the cash receipts and
disbursements method of accounting. 133 (The ruling is specifically limited to
that method.) The Treasury's reasoning is as follows: Section 402(b), which
provides for income tax consequences to the employee in the year of employer
contribution when the employee's rights in the contribution are nonfor-
feitable, applies only to funded trusts. Since no trusts or contributions thereto
are involved in unfunded plans, the tax consequences of section 402 do not
apply. The ruling concludes, with an example of a deferred compensation
plan for executives, stating that additional compensation to be received by a
taxpayer under a contract will be included in his gross income only for the
taxable year in which he actually receives the payments previously only
credited to his account.
134
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-1(b) (1957).
128. E.g., CCH 1963-1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 11 916.003, 916.006.
129. 271 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1959).
130. 177 F. Supp. 373 (D. Cal. 1959).
131. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(d)(i) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6584, 1962-1 INT.
REv. BULL. 67; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1957).
132. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 174.
133. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 174.
134. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 180.
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Tax Liability of Decedent's Estate
The actuarily-computed present value of a beneficiary's right to receive
payments under nonqualified plans is normally included in the deceased em-
ployee's gross estate.135 The Code provides that included in the gross estate
shall be
the value of an annuity or other payment receivable by any bene-
ciary by reason of surviving the decedent under any form of con-
tract or agreement, .. . if under such contract or agreement, an
annuity or other payment Was payable to the decedent, or the dece-
dent possessed the right to receive such annuity or payment, either
alone or in conjunction with another for his life or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death, or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death.
136
Note the necessity of some inter vivos character to the benefit payments;
absent this feature the payments escape inclusion in the gross estate.
The language "annuity or other payment" refers to "one or more pay-
ments extending over any period of time," whether the payments are "equal
or unequal, conditional or unconditional, periodic or sporadic."1' 3 7 The phrase
" 'contract or agreement' includes any arrangement, understanding or plan,
or any combination of arrangements, understandings or plans arising by
reason of the decedent's employment.' 1 38 With respect to the necessary inter
vivos character of the payment, the "annuity or other payment 'was payable'
to the decedent if, at the time of his death, the decedent was in fact receiv-
ing an annuity or other payment, whether or not he had an enforceable right
to have the payments continued."' 39 "The decedent 'possessed the right to
receive' " the payment "if, immediately before his death, he had an enforce-
able right to receive payments at some time in the future," whether or not
he had a present right to receive them at the time of his death. 140 An en-
forceable right to receive payments at some time in the future exists if the
deceased employee had complied with his obligations under his agreement
with the employer up to the time of his death. 14 1
The only nonqualified payments excluded from the gross estate are those
135. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039.
136. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(a). (Emphasis added.)
137. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666, 1963-32 INT.
REV. BULL. 22.
138. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666, 1963-32 INT.
REV. BULL. 22.
139. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666, 1963-32 INT.
REV. BULL. 22.
140. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6666, 1963-32 INT.
REV. BULL. 22.




under contracts expressly providing that no payments will ever be made to
the employee, all accrued benefits going to a beneficiary after the employee's
death. The essential inter vivos character is absent, and the value of the pay-
ments is not includable under section 2039. The courts have so held although
their reasoning differs somewhat. 14- One writer has reached the interesting
conclusion that survivor benefits under nonqualified plans are includable in
the gross estate under section 2033 as property in which the decedent had an
interest. 143 The Commissioner has not yet availed himself of this argument.
1 4 4
The view does not seem logical: To be includable in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2033 property must be "beneficially owned" by the dece-
dent at the time of his death.1 45 It is doubtful that the decedent can be said
to beneficially own the right to have post-mortem payments made to his bene-
ficiary even though the right is, of course, of some benefit to him.
Gift Tax Consequences Under Nonqualified Plans
Ordinarily there are no gift tax consequences attaching to arrangements
involving nonqualified employee benefit plans; the "transfer," or naming of
beneficiary, is almost always incomplete and therefore the transaction is not
taxable as a gift. The one instance in which gift tax consequences do arise
occurs when an employee with nonforfeitable rights under a nonqualified
plan exercises an irrevocable election to make the benefits payable to a par-
ticular beneficiary. 146 The Regulations give as an example an employee with
a nonforfeitable right to receive an annuity, who elects to take a reduced
annuity upon the condition that a similar reduced annuity will be paid to
a given beneficiary; the employee has given up his power to deprive the
beneficiary of the promised payment.
147
SPECIFIC NONQUALIFIED PLANS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
The preceding discussion has been general in nature. With this back-
ground, it is possible to examine the particular effects of some of the more
commonly employed nonqualified benefit plans and their methods of grant-
ing benefits.
142. See McCobb v. All, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12096 (D. Conn. 1962); Estate
of Bahen v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12091 (Ct. Cl. 1962) ; Wadewitz v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 925 (1963); Whitworth v. Commissioner, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
177 (1963) ; see also Zissman, Problem Areas in the Estate Tax, 41 TAXES 885 (1963).
143. Gordon, TUL. TAX INST. 593.
144. See Estate of Bahen v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12091 (Ct. Cl.
1962).
145. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6684, 1963-46, INT.
REV. BULL. 19.
146. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (10) (1958).
147. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(10) (1958).
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The Use of Funded Trusts
Frequently an employer will create a funded trust to carry out the
terms of a pension or profit-sharing plan. Usually the payments therefrom
are taxable as income to the beneficiary. 148 They are taxable to the extent
that the contributions of the employer were taxable when made and to the
extent of the employee's contributions. If the investment in the contract con-
cept applies, amounts included in the gross income of the employee during
his life are excluded. If the contributions by the corporation are put in a
trust to fund the contract but are still forfeitable the employee is not taxed
at the time of the contribution.
1 49
Payments from funded trusts are taxed as annuities, and the 5,000 dollar
death-benefits exclusion cannot be taken all at one time. That amount be-
comes a portion of the investment in the contract, and a proportion of each
payment determined under the familiar annuity rules constitutes tax-free
income to the beneficiary. 150
Deferred Compensation Plans
The IRS treats any nonqualified employee benefit plan which is not
a pension or profit-sharing plan as a "deferred compensation plan";'"
however, in the present discussion the term is restricted to the most common
deferred compensation arrangement-present salary payments deferred to
a later year. In furtherance of this type of plan the employer will often pur-
chase an endowment life insurance policy or retirement annuity contract to
guarantee funds to carry out his unsecured obligation to pay.1 52
The availability of a deduction to the employer, the income tax con-
sequences to the beneficiary, and the gift tax consequences to the employee
in the case of deferred compensation plans are what one could expect in light
of the earlier general treatment of the effects of distributions from post-
mortem plans. For example, the employer is entitled to a deduction for the
payments only when the beneficiary actually receives them, because only then
do they become nonforfeitable
1 5 3
There are some interesting problems in connection with includability in
the decedent's gross estate. Under principles previously discussed, the value
of the right to payments under deferred compensation agreements is included
148. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 61, 101(b), 402-03.
149. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b). If contributions are forfeitable, section
402(b) does not apply. Doty v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9761 (6th Cir. 1963).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-8(b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6665, 1962-33 INT.
REV. BULL. 7.
151. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-04, referring passimi to "any plan deferring
the receipt of compensation."
152. 1961 So. CAL. TAX INST. 325.
153. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (5); Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)(12) (1956).
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in the decedent's gross estate if the decedent would have been entitled to
inter vivos payments had he lived long enough. In some cases, however, cer-
tain inter vivos aspects exist, although the employee would never be entitled
to inter vivos payments under any circumstances. These aspects may be
sufficient to cause the payments to be included in the gross estate of the
decedent. Probably the value of payments to a beneficiary must be included in
the decedent's gross estate if the employee possessed during his lifetime the
power to change the beneficiary or to affect the time or manner of the bene-
ficiary's enjoyment of the payments.1 54 In McCobb v. All1 55 and Estate of
Bahen v. United States'56 death benefit payments were included in the gross
estates of deceased employees, because the payments were incorporated into
plans including other payments which might have been received by the
decedents had they lived long enough; the payments in question were part
of plans with a "lifetime aspect."
In both McCobb and Bahen the employees had no voice in determining
the agreement under which the post-mortem payments would be made, and
could not themselves have received the payments under any circumstances.
If the employee is given a voice in determining the original arrangement,
the following situation could occur: The employer could deliberately create
a situation in which he possessed no right to change the beneficiary, or the
time or manner of enjoyment, and no right to receive inter vivos payments.
Then later if it suited his purposes he might negotiate for and obtain one
of these rights. In Whitworth v. Commissioner'57 payments became due under
an individual agreement negotiated between the employer and the deceased
employee; the value of that payment, however, was excluded from the dece-
dent's gross estate, because under the terms of the agreement involved the
designation of the beneficiary was irrevocable. If the Whitworth case is
correct, then the fact that the employee had some voice in making the
agreement will not automatically render payments to beneficiaries pursuant
thereto includable in the deceased employee's gross estate. Nonetheless, it
can be argued with some force that a distinction should be drawn between
a situation where an employer has a plan which is applicable to all employees
of a particular class and a situation in which a contract of employment calling
for the death benefits is negotiated individually by the employer with an
employee. It will be recalled that the Treasury Regulations promulgated for
section 2033 included within the decedent's estate all property "beneficially
owned" by him at death. That language might be applied to payments which
154. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
155. 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12096 (D. Conn. 1962).
156. 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12091 (Ct. CI. 1962).
157. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 41 (1963).
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become due under a contract negotiated by an individual employee. Intimations
along these lines are found in the Bahen case.
Plans Calling for Payments From Current Earnings
The employer may defer the payment of part of an employee's corn-
pensation until a later year and make the amount then payable depend upon
current earnings in that year. For example, the employer could agree to allo-
cate to the employee's account a certain percentage of the employer's earnings
during the years of employment. Obviously, these agreements might reflect
many variations. The plan could be funded with an agreed portion of the
earnings for various years used to fund the plan. More frequently there will
be merely an unsecured promise to pay. The principles previously discussed
apply to these plans. If there is merely an unsecured promise to pay, the
employer is only entitled to his deduction when the payments are actually
made, because only then do rights in the payments become nonforfeitable.
Similarly, the payments would be taxable as ordinary income to the bene-
ficiary in the year received, and the 5,000 dollar death benefit exclusion will
inure to the beneficiary unless the payments are considered income in respect
of a decedent. Includability of payments in the gross estate of the deceased
employee will depend on whether inter vivos aspects are present; if the
employee had any of the inter vivos "ownership" attributes contemplated by
sections 2038 or 2039, as would be the case, for example, if the payments
were "joint and survivor" with regard to the employee and his spouse, the
value of the payments will be included in decedent's gross estate. For the
most part, the only innovation introduced by this type of plan is the factor
that the amounts to be treated as deferred compensation depend upon the
employer's profits.
With regard to gift tax consequences, an issue peculiar to arrangements
calling for the payment of undetermined amounts may be present. As noted
earlier there is one instance in which payments from nonqualified plans may
be subject to the gift tax: when an employee exercises an irrevocable option
to have the payments made to a particular beneficiary. With regard to plans
calling for payments from current earnings a problem may arise because of
the uncertainty as to the amounts which will be paid under the plan. It
might be very difficult, if not impossible, to value the gift under the Treasury's
rule that "the value of the property is the price at which such property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller." 158
Other Nonqualified Plans
There are a few other schemes sufficiently common to bear mention.
"Contractual bonus" plans obligate the employer by contract to pay a bonus
158. Treas. Reg. § 2512-1 (1958).
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to the employee or successors of the employee. The distinguishing feature
of this type of plan would be that the amounts paid should depend primarily
upon the results of the employee's efforts. No problems peculiar to this type
of plan are apparent.
"Salary continuation" refers to the arrangement whereby the employer
continues the decedent's salary to his widow or some other beneficiary for
a limited period of time. A contractual obligation to make the payments might
be present or only the employer's customary practice of making such pay-
ments. 15 9 Here again, no special problems should occur.
159. Rev. Rul. 62-102, 1962 INT. REv. BULL. 28, at 7. As to continuation payments
to widows generally, see Pelisek, Conflict in Widow's Cases Continues as Supreme Court
Denies Certiorari, 17 J. TAXATION, 118 (1963).
